Expulsion of Hu Jintao: Xi and Xiism to the Nth Power | International

What happened before the media with former President Hu Jintao in the recently closed 20th Congress of the CCP constitutes an absolutely abnormal event. It may indeed have been due to a sudden illness, but if it were true, there would be no reason to hide it from the public opinion of the country. These images have not been broadcast in the Chinese media, at least for the moment. This feeds a much more convoluted political interpretation of what happened.

If we add this circumstance to the unexpected non-reelection of Wang Yang (that of Prime Minister Li Keqiang is not so surprising in view of the effective fulfillment of his two terms), while waiting to know the composition of the new Politburo Standing Committee, the highest ruling body of the CCP, we could well find ourselves facing the virtual liquidation of the tuanpaithe current associated with former President Hu, with a modus operandi as embarrassing as it is dramatic.

In recent years, Xi had concentrated his artillery on the liquidation of the Shanghai clan associated with former President Jiang Zemin (96 years old), who was not present at the 20th Congress. Far from complementing that “victory” with an integrating effort with Hu’s followers, Xi would give a coup that, in practice, may allow him to establish a fully related highest governing body.

To this we should add the approved statutory modification, of a clearly ideological nature, abounding in the exaltation of Xi as the unquestionable leader and of Xiism not only as a guiding thought in that delicate stage that sets 2049 as the motivating north, but also with a position of supremacy without peer in the hierarchy, only comparable to Maoism.

Therefore, what is actually being finished in full is nothing other than denguism (1978-2002), pointed out as responsible for the “unbalanced development” of the country in recent decades and that Xi is preparing to “rectify” forceful way. And he supposes one more twist to the resolution on history approved last year that already raised him above the common mortals. And, finally, a message to the entire militancy of the PCCh, reiterating unwavering loyalty as the highest virtue of this time.

Installed in this dynamic, let us prepare to contemplate a CCP imbued with “fighting spirit” and arranged in a turtle formation to accelerate the course of history with that first horizon encrypted in 2035. If the circumstances allow it, Xi himself hopes to lead the CCP until that date, especially if, as it seems, a clear successor is not in sight.

The risks associated with this approach to the reorganization of the country’s leadership, whether in terms of leadership institutionality or political line, raise important questions that go beyond the mere question of succession. What China can expect the world —and society itself— if the one who governs it presumes to be a “block of steel”?

Xulio Rios He is Emeritus Advisor to the China Policy Observatory.

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